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Introduction
"Employers have no right to ask job applicants for their house keys or to read their
diaries- why should they be able to ask them for their Face book passwords and gain
unwarranted access to a trove of private information about what we like, what messages we send
to people, or who we are friends with?" commented Senator Charles Schumer of New York. 1
This sentiment regarding online privacy is a popular one among legislators, with bills introduced
in thirty-six state legislatures and Congress over the past two years aimed at protecting
employees or job applicants from employers requesting access to social media websites? The
current movement toward preventing employers from requesting passwords for social media
websites arose primarily after controversies developed surrounding state governments requiring
applicants' passwords. 3 The first of these stories involved a governmental entity in Maryland
demanding an applicant's Facebook password in 2011.4 Maryland soon thereafter became the
first state to propose and pass a bill, which bans employers from accessing social media
passwords and went into effect in October 2012. 5 After several similar stories cropped up across
the country, more states began to propose and enact these laws. Currently, six of the thirty-two

1

Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, Employer Demands for Facebook and Email Passwords as Precondition
for Job Interviews may be a Violation of Federal Law; Senators Ask Feds to Investigate (Mar. 26, 2012) (on file at
http://www .schumer.senate.gov/N ewsroom/record.cfm ?id=3363 96).
2
National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013
(2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx. These
numbers are those at the time of publication.
3
Lynne Bernabei & Alan R. Kabat, Invasions ofPrivacy; Congress and state legislatures are properly barring
employers' demands for social-media passwords, 34 NAT'L L.J. 42,42 (2012).
4 Jd
5
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 EWest2012).
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states that have proposed such legislation, California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
and New Jersey, succeeded in enacting laws in 2012. 6
Although an increased number of stories have been published regarding employers
demanding Facebook passwords, there are questions as to the actual extent of the practice and
1
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these laws. First, the laws themselves are difficult to enforce, with no one defmed administrative
mechanism or specific execution provision. Second, the acts are preemptive and lack substantive
facts or figures to warrant their passage. Third, employers already have an incentive to not
request access to an employee's online information in order to protect themselves from
discrimination, privacy, and other labor and employment-related lawsuits. Additionally, these
laws are not necessary to protect the employees or applicants who are asked for online
usernames and passwords and later fired or not hired based on social media information, since
those employees and applicants have other well-established means of protection such as privacy
torts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), and the First Amendment. 8
Despite these concerns regarding the recent legislation, state legislatures continue to
propose and pass these laws with ease, seemingly as an attempt to help those employees and
applicants. Meanwhile, many of the states are themselves the primary entities that have created
these online privacy issues in the first place in local government hiring. 9 State legislatures, rather
than passing wide-reaching laws that are not necessary, should use their energy to enact

6

National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2012
(20 13 ), http://www .ncsl. org/issues-research/tel ecom/emp }oyer-access-to-social-m edia-passwords.aspx.
7
Shel Israel, The Great Facebook Employee Password Non-Issue, FORBES (Mar. 25,2012, 8:32PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelisraeV2012/03/25/the-great-facebook-employee-password-nonissue/.
8
Stephen Hirschfeld & Kristin Oliveira, Keeping Facebookprivate; States and federal government are introducing
legislation to prevent employers from requesting social media passwords, 136 THE RECORDER 16 (2012).
9
See discussion infra Part II.A.
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legislation that regulates their own state and local agencies' employment guidelines. 10 Privatesector employers should be permitted to handle matters regarding the hiring and firing process
themselves, guided by the legal risks and exposure that come with employment decisions which
rely upon candidates' and employees' private online infonnation. 11 Since public and private
sector employers have different methods, obligations, and risks associated with employment
decisions, legislatures should not over-legislate and lump all employers together in these online
privacy acts. 12
This Note addresses the new legislative measures designed to protect employees' and
applicants' online privacy, and highlights some of the concerns about the passage of these acts.
The Note proceeds in three stages. Part I addresses the background of the various state and
federal legislative proposals. This Part reviews the history and reasoning behind the legislative
efforts, and dissects the laws themselves. Part II considers three concerns regarding the necessity
of these laws. The first is the question of enforceability. The second issue focuses on the lack of
evidence justifying these laws in the private sector. The third concern regarding this legislation is
the absence of any legal need to impose regulations on private sector employers that are already
protecting themselves from lawsuits by not requiring or even requesting online information from
its employees or applicants. After addressing those three primary concerns regarding the
necessity of these laws, Part III begins the analysis of how these three issues should affect the

10

T.G. Allison Jr., Public and Private Management: Are they fundamentally alike in all unimportant
respects, POLICY 1, Vol. 2, 14 (1983).
11
Anna Hickman, Don't Bother Asking for Facebook Passwords, The Corporate Counsel Newsletter, 27 LAW
JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS 7, 9 (Aug. 16, 2012).
12
Joe Weisenthal, The Public Sector vs. The Private Sector in One Colossal Chart,
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-the-public-vs-private-sector-2012-7; Allison Jr., supra note 10, at 14. These
articles show that the private sector is much more financially stable and successful than the public sector.
Additionally, there is a stark difference in managerial authority between the public and private sector. "The general
management functions concentrated in the CEO of a private business are, by constitutional design, spread in the
public sector among a number of competing institutions and thus shared by a number of individuals whose
ambitions are set against one another." Allison, at 21-22.
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passage of the legislation. Finally, this Note concludes that state and federal legislatures, rather
than addressing the wide-spectrum of both public and private sector employers, should limit such
legislation to only the public sector. There is yet to be a need for laws regarding online privacy
information beyond the public sector where, as here, the other concerns of enforceability and
means of protection for any injured employee or applicant outweigh the need for private sector
regulation.
Part I: Background
This section addresses the background and history leading up to the proposal of
legislation limiting access to employees' online information. Specifically, this section highlights
the controversies publicized by the media that drew attention to and served as the catalyst to
these legislative measures. This section also details the actual legislation in states that have
passed limiting laws, the states that have proposed similar laws, and the proposed federal bills.
Lastly, this segment provides an overview of the goals and reasoning behind the proposed
legislation.
A. History
Before state legislatures and Congress proposed laws banning employers from requesting
social media passwords from job applicants, several publicized controversies led to the demand
for these legislatives measures. The first major issue occurred in Maryland in 2011 13 When the
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services required the Facebook
password of a corrections officer in his recertification process, supposedly attempting to
determine whether the officer had ties to gang members. 14 The American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") of Maryland took a stance against this new practice in a press release issued in

13

Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42.
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February 2011. 15 The ACLU also posted a YouTube video highlighting the story and requesting
that the Department no longer request online passwords. 16 In response, the Department did
suspend the practice. 17 Nevertheless, soon thereafter in May 2012, Governor Martin O'Malley of
Mary land signed into law the online privacy act, proposed and passed by the Maryland
legislature. 18 This law was the first of its kind and marked the beginning of a nationwide trend. 19
A second controversy occurred in Bozeman, Montana in 2009, when the city government
required all job applicants to provide usernames and passwords for social media sites, including
Facebook, Google, Yahoo, MySpace, and YouTube. 20 In June of2009, the city manager of
Bozeman issued a statement suspending the city's requirement but only after the city government
received many complaints from its citizens about this practice? 1 On February 27,2013,
Montana's state Senate passed a bill protecting private electronic information of job applicants
and employees.22 The bill currently awaits a vote in the state House ofRepresentatives.Z3
A third issue arose in Minnesota, when a young girl came forward saying that her public
school demanded she provide her login information to Facebook and email accounts?4 The girl
said that the school asked for her passwords because of allegations that she was having
15

Press Release, The American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Want a Job? Password Please! (Feb. 14, 2011)
(on file at http://www.aclu~md.org/press_room/40).
16
Aaron C. Davis, Maryland corrections department suspends Face book policy for prospective hires, WASH. POST.,
Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011 022207486.html.
17 ld
18
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3~712 (West 2012).
19
National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2012
(20 13), http://www .ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer~access-to~social-media-passwords.aspx.
20
Declan McCullagh, Want a job? Give Bozeman your Facebook, Google Passwords, CNET, June 18,2009,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3~10268282-38.html.
21

ld; David Pardo, Bozeman, Montana Suspends Controversial Requirement that Job Applicants Provide
Usernames and Passwords to Facebook Accounts, SECURITY, PRIVACY AND THE LAw, July 15, 2009, available at
http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2009/07/bozeman-montana-suspends-controversial-requirement-that-jobapplicants-provide-usernames-and-passwords-to~facebook~accounts/.
22

S.B. 195, 63d Leg. (Mont. 2013).
ld; National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013
(20 13 ), http://www .ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media~passwords.aspx.
24
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, ACLU-MN Files Lawsuit Against Minnewaska
Area Schools (Mar. 6, 2012) (on file at http://www.aclu-mn.org/news/2012/03/06/aclu-mn-files-lawsuit-againstminncwaska-arca-schools).
23
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conversations about sex with another student.25 Supposedly, the school administrator informed
26

the girl that she would be punished if she did not provide the information. The ACLU of
Minnesota filed a lawsuit in 2012 against the girl's school district,27 the Minnewaska Area
Schools, as well as the Pope County Sheriffs office for violating the constitutional rights of a
minor student, speci:t1cally arguing that public entities violated the girl" s First Amendment right
to free speech for off-campus behavior and her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizures. 28
Besides these issues that arose from state or local government actions, there has also been
a general trend in the federal government requiring more detailed and in-depth information for
job applicants? 9 President Barack Obama created a more comprehensive vetting process for
high-ranking executive branch applicants than previous, including requiring disclosure of any "email(s) that might embarrass the president-elect, along with any blog posts and links to
their Facebook pages."30 Although the executive branch application did not require applicants to
relay their username or passwords for social media websites, it did require information regarding

ld
26ld
27
The school district and sheriffs office moved to dismiss, arguing that they did not violate the Constitution. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the girl's constitutional
rights were established and the defendants' conduct could amount to violations. However, the Court also found that
"certain claims advanced by the Plaintiffs-civil conspiracy to deprive [the minor] of her civil rights and intentional
infliction of emotional distress-have not been sufficiently pled," and were thus dismissed. R.S. v. Minnewaska
Area School District, Civ. No. 12-588,2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn.Sept. 6, 2012).
28
Id; Complaint at 2, R.S. v. Minnewaska Area School District. (No. 12-588), 2012 WL 3870868, at* 1 (D.
Minn.Sept. 6, 2012).
29
See generally Jackie Calmes, For a Washington Job, Be Prepared to Tell All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/us/politics/13apply.html?_r=2&. (discussing President Barack
Obama's seven-page questionnaire, which included 63 requests for personal and professional records, for highranking applicants for the President's first administration).
3o Id
25
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private Internet posts or e-mails. 31 Thus, the federal government created a standard of allencompassing application inquiries, covering information from new forms of online data. 32
Each of these controversies arose out of requirements for information from a
governmental entity.33 Each employer indicated that it asked for usemames and passwords to
serve as a background check or guard against inappropriate behavior. "Before we offer people
employment in a public trust position, we have a responsibility to do a thorough background
check," said Chuck Winn, Bozeman, Montana's assistant city manager, when originally
interviewed about the city's application requirements. 34 Despite the trend toward government
transparency, these acts raise some questions as to whether these requests are going too far. 35
Thus, in reaction to these issues, specifically after the Mary land story came out, state legislatures
decided it was time to take action. 36
B. Legislative Overview
As of the writing of this article, thirty-six state legislatures have now proposed or passed
legislation banning access to social media passwords. 37 Congress has also proposed legislation of
this kind. 38 In 2012, six states enacted legislation that prohibits employers and/or schools from
requesting an employee, student or applicant to disclose private online information- California,
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey. 39 Eight other states proposed online

31ld
32ld
33

See id at 4-5.
McCullagh, supra note 20.
35
Calmes, supra note 29.
34

36

National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usemames and Passwords 2012
(20 13), http://www .ncsl.org/issues-research/tel ecom/ employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx.
37ld
38
Password Protection Act of2012, H.R. 5684, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012); Social Networking Online Protection
Act, H.R. 537, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012).
39
CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:J-J2 (2012); New Jersey's state legislature passed the legislation unanimously in
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privacy legislation in 2012: Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington.40 Utah is the only state, thus far, to pass its act in
2013. 41 An additional twenty-one states proposed laws in 2013: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and West
Virginia.42
Two separate acts were proposed in Congress in Apri12012: H.R. 5684, the Password
Protection Act of 2012, and H.R. 5050, the Social Networking Online Protection Act.43 The
Password Protection Act would prohibit employers from requiring job applicants and employees
to provide access to their private online accounts.44 This act would apply to employers' use of
any online password information as a condition of employment, discrimination, or retaliation.45
The Password Protection Act would be integrated into the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
which was an act "passed by Congress in 1984 to address the unauthorized access and use of
computers and computer networks."46 The Social Networking Online Protection Act,
alternatively, would prohibit employers and schools from requiring or requesting that employees,
October, 2012. Martin Bricketto, NJ Senate Oks Bill Shielding Workers' Social Media Privacy, LAW360, Oct. 25,
2012, http://vv-vv-w .law360 .corrJarticles/3 g9441 /nj-senate-oks-bill-shieldiug-worke:rs-social-medja-privacy.
40
H.D. 4323, (Mass. 2012); H.F. 2982, 87th Leg., (Minn. 2012); H.B. 2060, 97th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012);
S.B. 6938, 235th Leg. (N.Y. 2012); S.B. 351, 129th Leg. (Ohio 2012); H.B. 2332 (Pa. 2012); H.B. 1505, 119th Leg.
(S.C. 2012); S.B. 6637, 62nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
41
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101- 34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012).
42
S.B. 1411, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013); H.B. 1901 & 1902, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); H.B.
1046, 69th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 5690 (Conn. 2013); H.B. 149 (Ga. 2013); H.B. 713, 27th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013); H.F. 272 (Iowa 2013); H.B. 2094 (Kan. 2013); H.B. 838, I 26th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
2013); H.B. 165, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); S.B. 195, 63d Leg. (Mont. 2013); L.B. 58, 103rd Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2013); A.B. 181, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013); H.B. 414 (N.H. 2013); S.B. 371, 51st Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.M. 2013); H.B. 1455, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013); S.B. 499, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013); S.B. 493
(R.I. 2013); S.B. 416, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); S.B. 7 (Vt. 2013); H.B. 2966, 81st Leg., 1st Sess. (W.Va.
2013).
43
H.R. 5684; H.R. 537.
44
H.R. 5684; Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8.
45
H.R.5684.
46
Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42(quoting Lewis and Roca LLP, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
'Authorization' in Flux and the Ninth Circuit Dilemma, Mar. 6, 2012,
http://www Jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=75d0f5 3e-e6ce-4165-a5dd-6fcd64a984 70).
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students, and job applicants provide a usemame or password to access a personal account on any
social networking website.47 This act would create a stand-alone new law limiting access to
private online information, rather than one combined with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.48
C. Enforcement Techniques
Of the seven states that have passed legislation banning access to online information, six
now ban both employers and schools from "requesting or requiring" any usernames or passwords
to online information.49 Delaware passed an act that banned only academic institutions from
requiring online password information. 50
Of these seven laws, only three of them have specified means of enforcing an employer's
or school's actions. 5 1 Utah's Internet Privacy Amendments provide that an aggrieved individual
may bring a civil cause of action, in which the court shall not award that individual with more
than $500. 52 Similarly, Michigan's Internet Privacy Protection Act provides that an individual
can bring a civil suit and may recover not more than $1,000 in damages, with any reasonable
attorney fees and court costs. 53 However, Michigan's Act also provides that a person who
violates this Act is guilty of a misdemeanor. 54 Therefore, Michigan's Act takes a step further
than Utah's and makes a violation a criminal action. 55

47
48

H.R. 537; Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8.
Jd

49

CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & E:l'v1PL. § 3-712 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B24-301 (2012).
50
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012)
51
CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29-18A:3-32 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B24-301 (2012).
52
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012).
53
MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012).
54 Jd
55

Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), with UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012).

9

The only other state law that includes a specific violation and enforcement provision is
New Jersey's, which again provides that an aggrieved individual may institute a civil action. 56
Unlike Utah's and Michigan's Acts, however, New Jersey's does not include a specific amount
of costs, but rather indicates that an individual is entitled to injunctive relief, compensatory and
consequential damages, plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs. 57
Thus, overall among the seven state laws that ban some sort of access to online
passwords, four state laws have no specific enforcement provision, three allow for civil actions,
two specify an upper limit for any award of damages, and one imposes criminal sanctions.58
When it comes to enforcement provisions of the federal bills, both bills include more
stringent and severe violation penalties. 59 Since the Password Protection Act would be
interwoven with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, enforcement provisions already exist. 60
There are several penalties in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act depending on the violation,
including both fmes and imprisonment from one to twenty years. 61 The Social Networking
Online Protection Act, on the other hand, is very clear that its remedy is a civil violation is
actionable by the Secretary of Labor. 62 Additionally, an employer that violates the Social
Networking Online Protection Act can pay a fine of no more than $10,000. 63 Therefore, the two

56

N.J. STAT.ANN. §§ 18A:3-29-18A:3-32 (2012).
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012), with MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), and
UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012).
58
CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29-18A:3-32 {2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B24-301 (2012).
59
H.R. 5684; H.R. 537.
6
°Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986).
57

6lld.
62

H.R. 537.

63

Jd.
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federal acts include provisions for harsher penalties and would allow for stricter enforcement via
civil suit and the Secretary of Labor. 64
D. Goals Behind Legislation
Each of the proposed bills or enacted statutes provides some restrictions against
employers requesting employees' or applicants' online passwords.65
This legislation prohibits employers or schools from requiring employees,
students or applicants to disclose their social-media passwords, or
otherwise to provide access to private material on social-media Web sites.
These legislative efforts also prohibit taking adverse actions against
individuals who refuse to disclose their passwords.66
Generally, employers are not able to gain non-workspace information without the employee's
consent.67 The legislators do not seem to be convinced by entities' explanations that by gaining
access to these personal accounts the employer is merely doing its due diligence and protecting
itself against incompetence, negligent hiring lawsuits, and resume fraud. 68 Where the bills have
been successful the state legislatures view gaining access to social media passwords as an
invasion of an individual's privacy and as a result seek to protect employees from these requests,
in addition to providing a remedy in case the law is not followed. 69
Part II: Problems with Legislation
This section of the Note presents arguments as to why state and Congressional efforts to
ban the practice of requesting online and social media passwords are not necessary. The first
reason is that the aforementioned bills-and undoubtedly copycat bills to come-are difficult to
enforce without a distinct implementation mechanism and an assortment of remedies. Second,

64

H.R. 5684; H.R. 537.
Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42.
66ld
67ld
68
Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8.
69
See generally id (parenthetical).
65
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there is no clear proof of how many employers or government bodies are requesting these
passwords, and not enough studies or statistics to glean the number of applicants affected by
these password requests. Therefore, these legislatures are preemptively passing acts without
proof of their actual necessity. Third, employers already have legal reasons to avoid seeking
password-protected information- to protect themselves against lawsuits or legal claims.
Employees or applicants who are required to provide social media access and then frred or not
hired have means to protect themselves, including bringing a claim of invasion of privacy or
discrimination against the employer. Thus, because an employer puts itself at risk for a lawsuit
when requiring social media passwords, the passage of these acts is merely a further disincentive
for employers to do something most are already avoiding.
A. Difficulty of Enforcement
An initial reason that laws banning employers from requesting an applicant's social
media passwords are ineffective is the difficulty of enforcement. 70 There are several reasons why
this legislation is difficult to enforce: (1) varying enforcement mechanisms creating uncertainty
among the different state and congressional bills; (2) infeasibility of monitoring employers or
governments; (3) lack offmancing for enforcement agency or function; and (4) the government's
enforcement power over the employer outside the public-sector is uncertain? 1
A major problem with enforcement is that many of the current bills have differing
enforcement mechanisms or are lacking them altogether. 72 Bills from different states provide
assorted enforcement actions, as discussed above. 73 While some states, such as New Jersey and
Utah provide private civil rights of action, other states, such as Michigan, create a misdemeanor

70

Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
72
See discussion supra Part I. C.
73 ld
71
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offense in addition to the civil and administrative remedies. 74 Additionally, Utah and Michigan
provide limited damages that a court can award to an aggrieved claimant, while New Jersey sets
no specific damage limit. 75 On the other hand, the bills proposed in other states, such as
California, Maryland, Missouri, and South Carolina provide no enforcement mechanism
whatsoever. 76 In those states, an individual could presumably bring a tort claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, and could use this legislation as the public policy basis?7
In that case, a full range of remedies would presumably be available?8 These varying
enforcement measures make it difficult for national employers to create and defend regulations
for the company as a whole. In Michigan, the company may be up for criminal charges, while in
Utah the company only has to pay a fine of $500?9
The congressional bills would also be difficult to enforce. 80 Specifically, the Social
Networking Online Protection Act "allows for enforcement only through the U.S. DOL, at a time
when that agency lacks the resources to enforce other federal employment statutes."81 In addition,
unlike in many of the state causes of action, the Social Networking Online Protection Act only
allows the Secretary of Labor to bring an action, while most states allow only for private civil
causes of action.82 This confusion again leads to difficulty for large national companies that span
several or all states, for that company could get sued by an individual in one state and pay a

74

Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012), and MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), with
UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012).
75
Compare UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012), and MICH. CoMP.
LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), with N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012).
76
CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012); H.B. 2060, 97th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); H.B. 1505, 119th Leg. (S.C. 2012).
77
Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42.
78Jd
79
MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B24-301 (2012).
80
H.R. 5684; H.R. 537.
81
Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42; Kenneth Kopelman, Closing the Courthouse Door on Section 503
Complaints; Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1176-77 (1983).
82
H.R. 537

13

minimum fine, and later get sued by the Secretary of Labor and pay a much larger fine. In turn,
the Password Protection Act, as mentioned above, which would amend the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, provides both civil and criminal means of enforcement.83 However, the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act covers a wide array of computer violations, and where the new amendment
would fit in is unclear, specifically in regard to the enforcement section.84
Another reason enforcement is impractical is because, where private suit is not
authorized, it is nearly impossible for the government to regulate, watch, and monitor every
employer in a certain jurisdiction. First, the United States has embraced an ideal that the Internet
should primarily be self-regulated. 85 Thus, the U.S. does not have a regulatory body for invasions
of privacy when it comes to online information. 86 Additionally, the Department of Labor
("DOL"), a department that could regulate this act federally, already "administers and enforces
more than 180 federallaws." 87 In a 2006 Performance and Accountability Report ("PAR"), the
DOL assessed twenty-eight of its programs to determine each programs' effectiveness. 88 Out of
the twenty-eight programs reviewed under the PAR, one was rated ''effective," eight were rated
"moderately effective," twelve were deemed "adequate," and the last four were ranked
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"ineffective."89 The DOL has also specifically admitted to ineffectively enforcing certain acts in
the past. 90
A third major issue with enforcement is fimding. 91 In this economic circumstances that
the United States now faces, the government is looking for measures to cut spending.92 "There
surely are more economic shocks in store, including increased unemployment, more corporate
defaults, and state and local government budget emergencies."93 In creating jobs or a government
entity to oversee employers in regard to this new legislation, only a further buildup of resources
and funding would occur in the public sector. But over the past year local, state, and federal
government jobs have dropped by 162,800 jobs, a .7 percent decline. 94 With declining job
numbers in the government sector, and the goal to cut government spending, including a recent
sequester, there is no money or manpower left to create an entity or pay more employees to
monitor employers and their online information usage. 95
Combining the reasoning above, the recent legislative measures attempting to ban
employers from requiring access to employees' or applicants' social media passwords are,
overall, difficult to enforce. The variability amongst the state and federal legislations, the
infeasibility of enforcement, the lack of funds needed to enforce these laws, and the question as
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to whether it should be the government's responsibility to monitor these employers lead to the
impracticability of implementing these laws, both administratively and functionally .96
B. Preemptive Legislation
Many of the controversies surrounding the password requests occur in state government
entities.

97

But, rather than the states handling these issues with state government policies,

specifically hiring policies, the states decided to legislate against these practices in both the
public and private sectors. 98 Beyond these state or local government accounts, there is reason to
doubt that many companies, employers, or schools are requesting online passwords. 99 Shel Israel,
ofF orbes states that
There is real question as to how widespread such practices really are. The
number of cases reported so far appears to have three aspects in common:
(1) They involve government positions, most of them public safety jobs.
This does not justify the privacy invasion, but may explain overreaction by
employers who really do need to worry about security. (2) All incidents
being reported are more than a year old. (3) As far as I could find, there is
not a single report of passwords being demanded by private sector
companies. 100
In his article, Israel argues that these online privacy bills are proposed without any proof as to
how many people are affected. 101 Specifically, he states that this is a non-issue that has been

Though there are not many statistics, or much evidence, revealing how many employers
are requiring passwords or how many applicants are affected by this practice, there are some
indicators that point to a lack of any problem regarding access to private online accounts,
especially within the private sector. In Senator Schumer's press release asking the U.S. Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC,') and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") to
investigate the recent activity of employers requiring online passwords, he cited "recent reports"
showing that "some" employers were requiring disclosure of passwords.103 The "recent reports"
that the press release makes reference to are three media stories to individual narratives. 104
In one case, the Associated Press reported a New York City statistician
was asked for his Facebook usemame and password so that the employer
could review private components of his profile as part of the interview
process for the job he was applying for. At least two other cases were
identified where individuals who were applying for jobs were required to
tum over Facebook passwords and usemames in order to be considered for
the job they were applying for, as well as a city that, until recently,
required job applicants to provide access to their email accounts. 105
These three accounts were the only factual bases used for Senator Schumer's report regarding the
practice of requesting or requiring online passwords in New Y ork. 106
In fact, when it comes to available statistics regarding how many employers are requiring
an online password, there are not many studies in existence. In one poll, however, of over 1,000
high-level companies completed by Littler Mendelson, P.C., fewer than one percent of those
companies said that they had "requested social media logins as part of the hiring or onboarding
process." 107 Though this does not cover all companies, it strongly suggests that almost none of
the most successful private sector entities are requesting social media passwords. 108
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This is not the first time, however, that legislation has been enacted to deal with a
supposed problem without statistics and evidence to document the existence of the problem in
the first place ..109 A recent act passed preemptively was the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"), 110 which was passed by Congress in 2008 to prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees or applicants based on genetic information.n 1
Some in opposition to this act said that there was no proof that any such discrimination was
occurring and that discrimination based on genetic information is rare.112 Congress relied
primarily on three individual examples of genetic discrimination, all of which arguably could
have relied on relief claims under Title VII or the American with Disabilities Act. 113 Therefore,
Congress seemed to preemptively pass GINA without solid statistics or any strong evidence for
its need .114
Though GINA protects against possible discrimination based on genetic information,
there are some downsides of GINA having been preemptively passed. 115 One negative is it is
nearly impossible to measure the Act's effectiveness without prior statistics. 116 Therefore,
discovering whether the legislation has actually protected anyone is nearly impossible.117
Another consequence of Congress passing GINA preemptively is that GINA "may fail to
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alleviate (or may even legitimize) fears of genetic-information discrimination." 118 Because
Congress passed GINA before genetic discrimination affected many people, it seems possible
that GINA raises more awareness about genetic discrimination than is desirable,119 lncluding
generating fears of discrimination that did not previously exist.120 Rather than protecting and
assuaging peoples' fears, it creates and stimulates the necessity of that fear. 121
GINA provides a comparison for the legislation banning employers from requesting
social media passwords, at both the state and congressional levels. Like GINA, this recent
password legislation does not have much empirical evidence, and relies heavily on anecdotal
personal stories.122 Without much data, therefore, the password legislation seems also to be
preemptive, and thus encounters those same problems that GINA does. Typically, and in the
past, discriminatory legislation was passed retroactively. 123
C. Employers' Disincentives
Employers open themselves up to lawsuits by looking into online information,
specifically by viewing private personal information. 124 Employees or applicants could bring suit
against the employer for using private information in the hiring or firing process on various bases
including religion, sexual orientation, disability, or marital status,. 125 If an applicant is not hired
after providing social media access, that applicant can later claim that said information was the
reason.
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These employers, who review online information or require social media passwords,

open themselves up to claims ranging from discrimination and retaliation to constitutional or

118Jd
See id
120
Roberts, supra note II5, at 465-66.
121
ld at 490.
122 ld.
123
ld at 457.
124
Hickman, supra note II, at 9.
125
Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8.
126ld
119

19

tort-based privacy issues. 127 For example, Title VII states that it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 128 The First Amendment also
protects freedom of speech; and freedom of religion. 129 In addition, one of the four torts that
falls under the rubric of invasion of privacy is intrusion upon seclusion, which addresses acts of
intrusion into a victim's zone ofprivacy. 130
There have been several examples of employers not hiring a job applicant, and that
applicant then raising a claim of discrimination because of discovered online information. 131
While the cases do not arise specifically from employers requesting private passwords, they do
involve employers discovering an applicant or employee's personal information from online
resources. 132

Gaskellv. University ofKentucky, 2010 WL 4867630 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2010), involves
a discrimination claim under Title VII. 133 Gaskell alleged the university rejected him after the
hiring committee found information on his religious views during an Internet search. 134 Though
this case does not involve requesting online passwords, it shows that even a basic Internet search
opened the employer to liability based on the information discovered. 135 In the end, the judge
denied cross-motions for summary judgment, and the case would have proceeded to further trial
if it had not settled for $125,000. 136 Although this case settled, it reveals that a triable issue of
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fact can exist in a discrimination claim from discovered online information. 137 Therefore, an
employee or applicant could raise a discrimination claim under Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act from information discovered during
a search using their personal passwords. 138
A second example is Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 2011), 139 which involved
the University of Iowa's College of Law and its failure to hire a writing instructor, whose
political beliefs were available online. 140 In the end, the court found that Wagner141 , the
applicant, had presented enough evidence of discrimination that the case could be brought to a
jury. 142 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit applied the following test:

In political discrimination cases, nonpolicymaking employees have the
threshold burden to produce sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence
from which a rational jury could fmd that political affiliation was a
substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse employment action. At
that point the employer must articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the
adverse employment action and prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have been taken without regard to plaintiffs political
affiliation. 143
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit determined that a typical nondiscrimination test should also apply
for cases in which discriminatory information is discovered through online means. 144 And thus,
the First Amendment with its political freedom and freedom of speech provisions applies to
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online information, and could also apply to information discovered during a search with an
employee's or applicant's password to information available via social media. 145
In short, employers are already incentivized not to require passwords from applicants or
employees because of the possibility of lawsuits. 146 Even a simple Google or Facebook public
search can yield discoverable information that can lead to a claim against the employer if that
person is not hired or fired. 147 Some employers may not heed these warnings. However, those
employers expose themselves to an applicant's or employee's claim, as evidenced by Gaskell
and Wagner. 148 The strategy that the employer uses in the hiring process or when reviewing
employees will depend on how much risk the employer is willing to assume.

Part III: Analysis
Combining the three primary arguments from above- (1) that the legislation is difficult
to enforce; (2) that the laws are preemptively passed; and (3) that an employer should be
protecting itself from lawsuits by not asking for any employees' or job applicants' passwords for
any private information that could lead to discrimination or privacy claims-this Note argues
that legislative efforts banning access to employers' access to passwords is mistaken. First, this
section explains why legislators should not be passing these acts. Second, the section determines
that legislators should, at this time, regulate only within the public sector, rather than
overreaching into the private sector, which has not shown a need for regulation regarding online
passwords. Overall, because these legislative measures have not been proven to help many
people, and because history teaches that government entities would be the primary violators of
these laws, the legislators would be better off setting a standard for internal government hiring
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and firing rather than broadly requiring employers to adhere to a law that most are not breaking

in the first place.
A. Setting the Stage for Legislative Ineffectiveness
When it comes to the enforcement of the acts, many state laws have different
enforcement mechanisms, ranging from administrative enforcement to criminal offenses. 149
Some other states have no enforcement written into the act at all. 150 Thus, enforcement
mechanisms and remedies vary state to state. This hodgepodge of enforcement methods not only
make it confusing for those individuals looking to bring claims against an employer or company,
but also make it difficult for attorneys and courts to handle these types of claims.
An individual could either bring a claim in state courts or federally under the Password
Protection Act. These different opportunities could allow for various remedies for the plaintiff,
and assorted penalties for the employer. 151 These differences would generate confusion for
individuals when preparing to bring a claim, as to which jurisdiction would be best. Additionally,
the differences would allow for preference as to certain courts or jurisdictions for each party, as a
state court or federal court might be more beneficial in a particular remedy or penalty for a given
party.
These differences in enforcement mechanisms and penalties also create problems for the
legal system overall. Because of the different enforcement provisions, certain jurisdictions are
likely to be more favorable to one party than another. Thus, the other party would likely try and
remove the case to an alternate, more advantageous district. Therefore, the varying enforcement
provisions would likely lead to a high number of motions to transfer venue or remove to federal
court. That would create a backlog of administrative issues for courts to handle. Because of the
149
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increase in time and labor, this backlog would also likely lead to increased attorneys fees for the
parties involved.
Enforcement also becomes a problem with respect to what entity would be in charge of
regulating the activities of the employers. In one sense, it seems impractical for an existing
government department to take on inspection of every company, organization, employer, and
school in a certain district. This is especially the case since the U.S. government does not have a
regulatory body for privacy invasions of online information and since the DOL has admitted to
handling other laws ineffectively .152 Additionally, in this economy, it is simply not reasonable to
create a new government body to oversee a new act. Local, state and federal governments all
lack the ability to employ people to act as a watchdog over every company to make sure it does
not request disclosure of passwords. Additionally, in this economy, it is simply not reasonable
for a single entity to police an employer, especially when the overall number of government
employees, both at the state and federal levels, is decreasing. 153 With a decline in the number of
federal inspectors and the lack of any non-governmental agency to fulfill this role, it is illadvised to require an agency already stretched thin yet still charged with enforcing hundreds of
federal laws and regulations as well as the oversight of every federal employment law, to now
review every employment application form in the nation to ensure that the employer is not
asking for social media passwords in order to quell a problem for which there is no empirical
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evidence to show that it even exists. 154 Generally speaking, the funding that is necessary to
monitor companies is not available at this time. 155
Without proof that other applicants or employees have been affected by policies invading
personal password information, it seems that legislators acted before it was necessary to create a
solution to a false problem to please their constituents. If the only occurrences were individuals
discussing their stories via the media, the government legislatures have based countless hours of
writing and proposing this legislation on media firestorm. Seemingly, it would have been much
easier, faster, and simpler for the state governments to self-regulate their own policies before
assuming most other companies are also requesting passwords. But, with the statistics currently
available, evidence showing a need for the password legislation does not present itself, at least
not for the private sector. Thus, it appears that this social media legislation was passed
preemptively, without the crucial proof or need for protection.
A good example of the problem of preemptive legislative action is GINA. 156 Since its
passage, several complaints over the passage of GINA have arisen. 157 Without strong statistics to
support the reasoning for GINA and its passage, it becomes nearly impossible to measure the
effectiveness of the acts. 158 Also, GINA may also have legitimized fears regarding discrimination
based on genetic information, because it publicized the fear of something that was not much
discussed previously .159 Thus, there arise several issues with preemptive legislation, as
exemplified by GINA. Though no real problems have emerged since GINA's passage, it is not
clear whether it has accomplished anything. The time and money spent to pass this law could
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have been used elsewhere. Thus, like GINA, the laws banning employers' access to online
information are preemptive and raise many of the same concerns. Further, this preemptive
passage of such acts may not be the most effective means of preventing problems regarding
online discrimination.
Finally, legislators are misusing time and resources in passing these social media laws
because an employer should be protecting itself from lawsuits by not asking for any employee's
or job applicant's passwords for any private information that could lead to discrimination or
privacy claims. Employers that review online information, and especially those that gain access
to private passwords, expose themselves to legal claims ranging from discrimination and Title
VII to constitutional privacy and Fourth Amendment issues. 160
Often times, for private sector employers, the threat of liability is more frightening than
an unclear and unorganized means of enforcement mechanisms employed through the laws and
bills. 161 A company might rather pay a limited fine or penalty to the government for its wrongful
actions rather than begin a protracted litigation process, which could involve paying a large sum
to the plaintiff in addition to legal fees. Therefore, the basic fear of legal actions against an
employer provides a better disincentive to those companies than laws that have various means of
enforcement.
B. Public Sector v. Private Sector Legislative Oversight
Considering the three arguments from above, a trend emerges. That trend is that the cases
involving password requests have stemmed primarily from local government entities. Because all
the prior proof regarding issues with employers occurred in the public sector, there is no
evidence pointing to a need for protection in the private sector. The state government positions,
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and local school districts, have led to the publicity regarding the requirement to access private
online information. Thus, legislators should be monitoring and regulating those public sector
government agencies and schools, rather than passing widespread action that affects those
without a need for it.
Overreaching legislation can be dangerous. The legal system and the nature of judicial
review are meant to protect against congressional overreaching. 162 Specifically, many people fear
that overreaching legislation takes away the rights of individuals in areas that have traditionally
been protected by the Constitution and the courts. And, since private sector employees already
have protections, the government may not be necessary or the best, most efficient means of
enforcement, especially if by doing so it enters a new sphere of government regulation over
private corporations.
Overall, the legislators should be spending their time and the taxpayers' money in more
efficient ways. The 112th Congress, from 2011-2012, was the least productive Congress on
record in the United States, passing only near two percent of proposed bills. 163 Whether the
proposal and passage of these social media bills is just a means of enacting something, or
whether the legislators legitimately believe that access to online information is a formidable
problem, these laws are ineffective in their current form. Legislators should have first addressed
the problem within the public sector. If online social media access becomes a larger and more
widespread occurrence, then that is the time legislators should take action.
Conclusion
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In the end, the online privacy legislation is ineffective in protecting employees,
applicants, and students. The fact that no clear statistics reveal that many people are affected by
password requests, in addition to the fact that not many private sector employers are using this
practice because of the threat of lawsuits is seemingly enough to show that these laws are not
necessary within the private sector. Additionaily, the specit1c proposed laws, and the several that
were passed, are preemptive because of the lack of evidence, and also lack effectual enforcement
mechanisms.
Rather, these various legislative measures seem to be preemptive in nature, and
overreaching in their actions. Overreaching legislation spends unnecessary funds and takes a step
beyond what may be allowed. Largely, these acts are not helping many people and are
ineffective in their current state. This bill is not a solution to any real problem. And though it is
seemingly preemptive, there will never be evidence of its actual effect because the problem was
nonexistent.
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